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UNPRECEDENTIAL ANALYSIS AND ORIGINAL INTENT
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL*

Professor Harry Jones has argued that, in the interpretation of
documents, constitutions, or statutes, the focus of professional and
judicial attention shifts from the text of these materials to judicial
precedent as the text gets older and interpretive materials accumulate.1 In cases that require textual interpretation, then, the
grounds of decision are derived not from text or history but from
preexisting judicial interpretation.
Professors Kurland 2 and Laycock 3 argue, in my opinion correctly, that reliance on historic intent at best is not a definitive
guide to resolving issues under the religion clauses and at worst is
simply a false god being used in some quarters to justify personal
political agendas. Because the text of the first amendment is openended, the religion clauses are classic examples of provisions for
which no definitive resolution is mandated by either textual language or historical understanding. Seemingly, then, in the normal
course of adjudication, the next appropriate focal point from which
to generate actual case decisions would be judicial precedent.
This why the criticism aimed at the Court for its decisions during the 1984-85 Term is so startling. As Professor Kurland notes,
the Court was criticized precisely for relying on its previous decisions.4 It was criticized for doing what it should have been doing.
Superficially, of course, one easily can understand any criticism
of the Court's judicial pronouncements concerning the religion
clauses. Any jurisprudence suggesting that a constitutional difference exists between providing certain services to parochial school
children on school grounds and providing those same services to
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of Constitutional Law, 4 VT. L. REv. 1, 27-29

(1979).
2. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 W. & MARY L.
REv. 839 (1986).
3. Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986).
4. Kurland, supra note 2, at 840-41.
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them in a mobile home across the street from the school 5 is not a
jurisprudence that easily evokes intellectual respect. More importantly, the case against the Court's jurisprudence can be made on
grounds far stronger than simply dubious line-drawing. At times,
the Court has been guilty of obvious distortion. The suggestion
that a predominantly secular purpose underlies the inclusion of a
nativity scene in a Christmas display,6 for example, is dubious at
best. Equally suspect is the condemnation of a government program because it impermissibly entangled church and state, even
though that program had a nineteen-year history in which no such
violation had occurred.'
Nevertheless, before overruling an entire jurisprudence wholesale, it is advisable to inquire into both the social effects inherent
in such a displacement and the jurisprudential need for it. This
inquiry, moreover, is particularly appropriate when the result of
disavowing the former jurisprudence would be as radical as the result advocated by those who suggest a constitutional analysis based
on so-called "original intent." Indeed, a review of constitutional
law suggests that overruling an entire jurisprudence on the
grounds proposed by the Justice Department would be unparalleled in its extremism. Even in Brown v. Board of Education' the
Court did not purport to overrule the entire preexisting precedential framework; it suggested only that the previous understanding
of equal protection had been determined inappropriately.
Perhaps the only instance in which the Court made a comparable refocusing of an entire area of law was Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 0 when the Court announced, on second thought, that
its 100-year understanding of the meaning of the Rules of Decision
Act had been incorrect or, if correct, was unconstitutional. 1 Erie,
however, did not provoke the reaction that undoubtedly would accompany a resort to so-called "original intent" analysis. Decisions
5. Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-73 (1975) with Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 244-48 (1977).
6. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984).
7. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3234-39 (1985).
8. See id. at 3243 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).

11. Id. at 73.
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concerning the constitutionality of the application of federal common law in diversity cases do not compare with Court pronouncements concerning the proper relationship between church and
12
state in our society's imaginations, hearts, and political health.
In this respect, it is notable that Professor Kurland observed
some Itwenty-four years ago that when Engel v. Vitale 3 and Bakdr
v. Carr14 were decided in the same year, Engel created all the controversy, not Baker, even though Baker much more dramatically
affected the political entrenchment and power of a significant segment of the Nation. 15 Even now-or perhaps even more
now-decisions concerning the religion clauses seem to evoke responses decibels higher than those accompanying other cases. 16 I,
for one, appreciate the fact that the Court ducked a decision in
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,I" if only because it
saved the Nation either from cries that the Court had authorized
the preaching of sex, Communism, and humanism while outlawing
religion in the public schools or, if the decision had gone the other
way, from cries that the Nation was one breath away from the inculcation of evangelical theology in public education. Yet the
megaton explosion that might have enveloped Bender and that did
envelop Lynch v. Donnelly' s would be a hush compared to the conflagration that would occur if the Court constructed an entirely
new direction based on one advocate's highly debatable claim of
history "properly understood." The Court surely is correct in
avoiding this controversy when the case for overruling its

12. The lack of public attention devoted to Erie is noted in Younger, Observation: What
Happened in Erie, 56 Tax. L. REV. 1011, 1029 (1978).
13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying...", 1962
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 1 (quoting Lewis, Supreme Court's Term Viewed as One of the Most Sig-

nificant in its History, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1962, at 12, col. 4).
16. See Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution,1983 Sup. CT. REv. 83,
97-98.
17. 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986) (dismissing suit because party lacked standing).
18. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). For discussions of the Court's consideration of the municipallysupported creche at issue in Lynch, see Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.
Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770, 78187; Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19, col. 2.
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purported errors has not been made strongly and when, as Professor Kurland suggests, the case cannot be made more strongly.19
By this point, attentive readers will have realized that all this
Comment has done so far is suggest that those seeking to change
the current jurisprudence may be misguided. The more important
question, however, is whether the existing jurisprudence, which admittedly is inconsistent and at times incomprehensible, should be
abandoned precisely because of its lack of clarity. This claim has
been made, not so much by Attorney General Meese, but by thenAssociate Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree2
I think this claim also is flawed. My conclusion, however, does
not turn on yet another revisionist account of the Framers' intent;
nor does it turn on a doctrinal defense of the Court's interpretations of the establishment and free exercise clauses, as announced
in the leading cases, Lemon v. Kurtzman21 and Sherbert v. Verner.22 In fact, with respect to the Court's specific doctrinal approaches, I have argued previously that the Court's announced
tests are not sufficient as normative bases for future decisionmaking and are not even satisfactory explanations of the cases themselves. 23 Rather, my defense of the Court rests on a general overview of its judicial precedents-the interpretive criterion advanced
at the beginning of this Comment as being the most pertinent to
contemporary constitutional interpretation.
Admittedly, this precedential record has been a limited
one-primarily occupying only forty years-but the things that the
Court has not accomplished in that time are notable. The Court
has never adopted the separationist stance sought by liberals and
their sometimes strange bedfellows, evangelicals. It has not

19. See Kurland, supra note 2, at 841.
20. See 472 U.S. 38, 106-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also suggested that the Court's historical understanding of the Framers' intent was misguided, but
he acknowledged that this infirmity alone would not necessarily be fatal to existing doctrine.
Rather, Justice Rehnquist criticized the doctrine mainly for failing to provide an intelligible
precedential framework. Id. at 106-07.
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
23. See Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Marshall, Establishment];Marshall,
Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545
(1983).
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adopted the accommodationist stance sometimes sought by major
religious groups seeking aid or by certain conservatives seeking affirmative approval of religion. It has not created a wall. It has not
maintained a course of strict neutrality between religions or between religion and nonreligion. In short, it has kept absolutely nobody happy. If the Court, for example, was seen to have vindicated
one side of the church and state controversy in the decisions of the
1984-85 Term, then it was perceived as having vindicated another
in the decisions of the previous Term.
I have written elsewhere that the Court's jurisprudence may be
more sensible than it initially appears.24 Taking seriously my role
as the Court's only champion, I even have suggested-to universal
incredulity-that a sound policy basis underlies many of the
Court's distinctions.2 5 I do not and cannot argue, however, that the
Court has embarked on anything remotely approaching a consistent course. Yet there may well be a potential benefit created by
this wavering. Because there have been no clear winners, there also
have been no clear losers, and it may be that it is the elimination
of winners and losers that the religion clauses are ultimately
about. 26 If no single approach to religious issues has dominated,
then something must be right.
A concluding remark, which might be termed an "unhistorical
postscript, 2 7 is in order. It would seem that in the search for the
original intent of the framers of the first amendment, one of the
best sources would be early Supreme Court decisions on the subject. In the religion area, only one case fits this description-Terrett v. Taylor2s-and a review of that case appears to reflect, albeit in dicta, 29 a less rigorous prohibition of state aid to
religion than the cases decided in the succeeding years have

24. See Marshall, Establishment, supra note 23, at 513-31.
25. Id. at 531-33.
26. See Kurland, supra note 2.
27. See S. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPr (D. Swenson & W. Lowrie
trans. 1941).
28. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). For a discussion of Terrett, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and CongressionalPowers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHL L. REv.
887, 901-05 (1982).

29. Justice Story's language is dicta because the Court did not decide the case on religion
clause grounds. See Currie, supra note 28, at 902-04.
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allowed.30 In Terrett, after all, Justice Story wrote: "[T]he free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained, by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform their
own religious duties, or by establishing funds for the support of
ministers [or] for the endowment of churches ... .
On the other hand, in terms of ascertaining original intent, the
facts that gave rise to Terrett are informative as well. The case
involved an attempt by the Virginia legislature in 1801 to assert
title to Episcopal Church property. Critically, however, the reason
Virginia asserted title was its conclusion that two of its previous
statutes, which had incorporated the church and had granted the
church title to the property, were inconsistent with principles of
religious freedom.3 2 Virginia's position, in short, was more hostile
to public accommodation of religion than has been the position of
33
the Court in contemporary cases.
Although Virginia's action was based upon the Commonwealth's
own constitutional provision, and not the first amendment, 34 the
Terrett history is significant because, as Professors Kurland and
Laycock have suggested, the contemporaneous Virginia experience,
of which Terrett was a part, may provide some of the best historical evidence for determining the Framers' original intent.3 5 Terrett, therefore, potentially provides a strong argument that original
intent analysis might lead to a prohibition against state incorporation of churches or grants of land title by states to churches-a
conclusion that seems rather inconsistent with the political agenda
of those who argue for a "return" to a jurisprudence of original
intent.
Two lessons emerge from this semi-historical exploration of Terrett. First, even original intent analysis is not likely to clear the
ambiguity or reconcile the conflicting strains that currently exist

30. See id. at 904.
31. Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 49.
32. Id. at 46-49; see Currie, supra note 28, at 901. Virginia's position that incorporation of
religious institutions violated principles of religious freedom apparently had emerged in
1786, when the Commonwealth had repealed its earlier incorporation of the Episcopal
Church. Id. This date, of course, is five years earlier than the date on which the states
ratified the first amendment.
33. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 667-72 (1970).
34. See Currie, supra note 28, at 904 nn.116-17.
35. See Kurland, supra note 2, at 853-54; Laycock, supra note 3, at 895-96.
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within religion clause jurisprudence. Second, those who play with
loaded guns should develop some measure of certainty as to which
way the barrels are pointed.

